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Neyole Misiko Jacob α & Muchelule Yusuf Wanjala σ 
Abstract- An intrusion detection system (IDS)  are devices or 
software’s that are used to monitors networks for any unkind 
activities that bridge the normal functionality of systems hence 
causing some policy violation. This paper reviews some of the 
intrusion detection systems and software’s highlighting their 
main classifications and their performance evaluations and 
measure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ntrusion Detection is the process of detecting actions 
that try to compromise the overall integrity and 
confidentiality of a resource. The goal therefore of 
intrusion detection is to identify accessors that attempt 
to intrude and compromise systems security controls. 
Current IDS examine the entire data features to detect 
any intrusion and misuse patterns, although some of the 
features may be redundant and may contribute less to 
the detection process [1]. Current anomaly based 
intrusion detection systems and many other technical 
approaches have been developed and deployed to 
track novel attacks on systems. 98% detection rates at a 
high and 1% at a low alarm rate can therefore be 
achieved by using these techniques [2]. This paper 
review the various intrusion detection systems by 
evaluating their performance measures. 
   
According to V. Jyothsna[3] there are three 
main types of intrusion detection systems: -signature-
based (SBS), anomaly-based (ABS) intrusion detection 
systems and Network Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS). SBS systems such as Snort [3]make use of 
pattern recognition techniques by maintaining the 
database of signatures of previously known attacks to 
compare them with newly analyzed data. An alarm is 
raised when similarities are established. On the other 
hand ABS systems such as PAYL [4] build a statistical 
model to describe the normal network traffic, where any 
abnormal behavior that deviates from the model are 
identified. On the contrary anomaly-based systems have 
the advantage that they can detect zero-day attacks [2].  
a) Signature based Detection 
With the explosion of internet commerce,          
e-business services on the web, e-banking and other 
high  profile  applications,  organizations  providing  this 
 
     
 
services need to prepare themselves to the best possible 
protection against unauthorized penetration [5]. 
Signature detection involves searching network traffic for 
a series of malicious bytes or packet sequences. The 
main advantage of this technique is that signatures are 
very easy to develop and understand if we know what 
network behavior we are trying to identify. The events 
generated by signature based IDS can communicate the 
cause of the alert. As pattern matching can be done 
more efficiently on modern systems so the amount of 
power needed to perform this matching is minimal for a 
rule set. This technique can be easily deceived because 
they are only based on regular expressions and string 
matching. These mechanisms only look for strings within 
packets transmitting over wire. More over signatures 
work well against only the fixed behavioral pattern, they 
fail to deal with attacks created by human or a worm with 
self-modifying behavioral characteristics. 
Signature based detection system (also called 
misuse based), this type of detection is very effective 
against known attacks, and it depends on the receiving 
of regular updates of patterns [6]. But signature based 
detection does not work well when the user uses 
advanced technologies like NOP generators, payload 
encoders and encrypted data channels. The efficiency of 
the signature based systems is greatly decreased, as it 
has to create a new signature for every variation. As the 
signatures keep on increasing, the system engine 
performance decreases. Due to this, many intrusion 
detection engines are deployed on systems with multi 
processors and multi Gigabit network cards. IDS 
developers develop the new signatures before the 
attacker does, so as to prevent the novel attacks on the 
system. The difference of speed of creation of the new 
signatures between the developers and attackers 
determine the efficiency of the system [2]. 
b) Anomaly based Detection 
An anomaly-based intrusion detection system is 
an intrusion detection system for detecting both network 
and computer intrusions and misuse by monitoring 
system activity and classifying it as either normal or 
anomalous. The classification is based on heuristics or 
rules, rather than patterns or signatures, and attempts to 
detect any type of misuse that falls out of normal system 
operation. This is as opposed to signature-based 
systems, which can only detect attacks for which a 
signature has previously been created [7]. The anomaly 
based detection is based on defining the network 
behavior. The network behavior is in accordance with the 
predefined behavior, then it is accepted or else it triggers 
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the event in the anomaly detection. The accepted 
network behavior is prepared or learned by the 
specifications of the network administrators. 
The important phase in defining the network 
behavior is the IDS engine capability to cut through the 
various protocols at all levels. The Engine must be able 
to process the protocols and understand its goal. 
Though this protocol analysis is computationally 
expensive, the benefits it generates like increasing the 
rule set helps in less false positive alarms. The major 
drawback of anomaly detection is defining its rule set. 
The efficiency of the system depends on how well it is 
implemented and tested on all protocols. Rule defining 
process is also affected by various protocols used by 
various vendors. Apart from these, custom protocols 
also make rule defining a difficult job. For detection to 
occur correctly, the detailed knowledge about the 
accepted network behavior need to be developed by the 
administrators. But once the rules are defined and 
protocol is built then anomaly detection systems works 
well. 
c) Network Intrusion Detection System 
NIDS are deployed on strategic point in network 
infrastructure. The NIDS can capture and analyze data 
to detect known attacks by comparing patterns or 
signatures of the database or detection of illegal 
activities by scanning traffic for anomalous activity. NIDS 
are also referred as “packet-sniffers”, because it 
captures the packets passing through the of 
communication mediums [6]. The network IDS usually 
has two logical components: the sensor and the 
management station. The sensor sits on a network 
segment, monitoring it for suspicious traffic. The 
management station receives alarms from the sensor(s) 
and displays them to an operator.  
The sensors are usually dedicated systems that 
exist only to monitor the network. They have a network 
interface in promiscuous mode, which means they 
receive all network traffic not just that destined for their 
IP address and they capture passing network traffic for 
analysis. If they detect something that looks unusual, 
they pass it back to the analysis station. The analysis 
station can display the alarms or do additional analysis. 
A fundamental problem for network intrusion detection 
systems (NIDSs) that passively monitor a network link is 
the ability of a skilled attacker to evade detection by 
exploiting ambiguitiesin the traffic stream as seen by the 
NIDS [8]. 
III. IDS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The majority of published documents claiming 
to evaluate IDSs are conducted as comparisons, rather 
than evaluations. Evaluation should be considered to be 
a determination of the level to which a particular IDS 
meets specified performance targets [9].The basic task 
in intrusion detection system is to classify network 
activities as normal or abnormal while minimizing 
misclassification [10]. Many problems exist in IDS and 
need to be addressed, such as the low detection 
capability against the unknown network attack, high 
false alarm rate, and insufficient analysis capability. 
Generally, intrusion detection is targeted as 
classification problem, to distinguish between the 
normal activities and the malicious activities [11]. 
According to the NSS publication “Intrusion 
Detection Systems Group Test(2001), the evaluation of 
each IDS consists of two components. The first 
component is a qualitative analysis of the various 
features and functions of each product. The comments 
and analysis of the various features are well considered 
and unbiased [12]. The group further established that 
the quantitative component of consisted of four tests of 
the NIDSs on a controlled laboratory network. These test 
focused upon specific performance indicators, attack 
recognition, performance under load, ability to detect 
evasion techniques and a stateful operation test.  
The performance measures used by these 
evaluation were: a ratio of attack detection to false 
positive, ability to detect new and stealthy attacks, a 
comparison of host vs. network based systems to detect 
different types of attacks, the ability of anomaly 
detection techniques to detect new attacks, 
improvements between 1998 and 1999, and the ability 
of systems to accurately identify attacks. The research 
also attempted to establish the reason each IDS failed 
to detect an attack, or generated a false positive. Both 
the 1998 and 1999 evaluations identified a number of 
weaknesses with existing IDSs.  
A number of these issues have since been 
resolved, while others are still valid. The testing process 
used sample of generated network traffic, audit logs, 
system logs and file system information. This 
information was then distributed to various evaluators 
who would provide the appropriate data to the Intrusion 
Detection Systems. This ensured each system was 
provided with identical data, whilst allowing proper 
configuration of each system.  
Ranum (2001) extract established that 
constructing good benchmarks and tests for IDS was 
difficult and in order to accurately measure IDS 
complexity one needed to expand considerable efforts 
in designing tests by ensuring that the tests weren’t 
inherently biased or inaccurate. This was a challenge to 
the IDS especially as they depend on operation 
environment. He further concluded that if tests were to 
be made they were to base on qualitative and 
comparative measures. In his summary he presented 
some experiences in benchmarking IDS with a focus on 
poorly designed tests and their effects. And a 
technology continue to advance the IDS management 
systems would become increasingly inefficient [13]. 
Alessandri [14] proposed the use of a 
systematic description scheme for regulating the 
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descriptions used to describe IDS functions. This 
approach should allow for an evaluation of IDSs based 
upon their descriptions, without necessitating 
experimentation. The disadvantage of this approach is 
the requirement of accurate descriptions. Currently such 
an approach does not exist so implementing it is not 
possible. This approach does hold a certain promise for 
the future. 
IV.  PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT CRITERIA 
a) Ability to Identify Attacks 
The main performance requirement of a NIDS is 
to detect intrusions. However the definition of an intrusion 
is currently unclear. In particular, many vendors and 
researchers appear to consider any attempt to place 
malicious traffic on the network as an intrusion. In reality 
a more useful system will log malicious traffic and only 
inform the operator if the traffic possess a serious threat 
to the security of the target host. Snort is tending towards 
this direction with the use an alert classification ranging 
from 1 to 10. With 1 representing a point of interest only 
and 10 representing a major threat to security.  
b)
 
Known vulnerabilities and attacks
 
All NIDSs should be capable of detecting 
known vulnerabilities. However research indicates that 
many commercial IDS fail to detect recently discovered 
attacks [15] [12]. On the other hand if a vulnerability or 
attack is known all systems should be patched, or 
workarounds applied thus the need for a NIDS to detect 
these events will be removed. Unfortunately the reality is 
that many systems are not patched or upgraded as 
vulnerabilities are discovered. This is clearly indicated by 
the number of system compromises that occur every 
day, and the fact that most of the problems on the SANS 
top twenty list are predominantly old well known 
problems, with fixes available.
 
c)
 
Stability Reliability and Security
 
Any IDS should be able to continue consistently 
operate in all circumstances. The application and 
operating system should be capable of running for years 
without segmentation faults or memory leakage. An 
important function of a NIDS is to consistently report 
identical events in the same manner. One disadvantage 
of a product using signature recognition is the ability of 
different users to configure different alerts to provide 
different messages. Thus traffic on one network may 
trigger a different alert to the same traffic on another 
system of the same type. 
 
A number of efforts are currently underway to 
solve this problem. Both securityfocus and CVE provide 
databases of known vulnerabilities, and exploits 
targeting them.  The system should also be able to 
withstand attempts to compromise it. If a attacker can 
identify a NIDS on a network it will could prove to be a 
valuable asset. It is also possible the attacker will 
attempt to disable the system using DoS or DDoS 
techniques. The system should be able to withstand all 
of these types of attack.  
d) Ease or complexity of configuration 
Unfortunately the usability of a system is usually 
inversely proportional to the flexibility and customizability 
of that system. The desire for flexibility can configurable 
of the system will be determined by the users of the 
system, the network in which it will be operating and the 
level of functionality required from the system.  If the 
system is to be maintained by a network administrator 
who is also responsible for standard network 
management he or she is unlikely to have the time 
available to optimize and configure the system so 
usability will be a primary consideration. On the other 
hand if an intrusion analyst if employed specifically to 
manage intrusion detection a more complex system with 
greater functionality may be desired.  
e) Possible configuration options 
The NIDS should be capable of being optimized 
for the systems on the network. As mentioned earlier 
there is no point in performing http analysis if a web 
server is not operating on the network under inspection. 
The level of traffic on the network will also determine the 
intensity of analysis performed. A simple system suitable 
for a single network segment with low traffic will be able 
to combine the sensor and analysis functions within the 
single unit. A network with high levels of traffic may need 
to separate the sensor and analysis functions across 
different hosts. 
f) Scalability 
Most organizations grow and expand over time. 
As they expand so do their supporting infrastructure, 
include computer networks. Any IDS should be capable 
of expanding with the network. As new network 
segments are added new NIDS may also be needed. 
Will it be possible to consolidate the reports from 
multiple NIDS into a single user interface? Another 
important question will be the storage of this 
information. If a small network is monitored data storage 
may be possible in flat files. However as the amount of 
data collected grows it may be necessary to transfer this 
data storage into a database.  
g) Interoperability 
Research has proven that the most effective 
intrusion detection requires correlating information from 
a range of sources. This includes NIDS, HIDS, system 
logs, firewall logs and any other information sources 
available. At the time of writing the Intrusion Detection 
Working Group (IDWG) had submitted a number of 
documents defining standards for communication 
between IDSs. It is expected that these will be released 
as RFCs in the near future.  Once these standards are 
implemented any IDS using the standard protocols will 
be able to communicate with and other IDS. This will 
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enable an organization to implement a range of IDS 
from different vendors and still maintain interoperability.  
h) Vendor Support 
The level of vendor support required in a 
implementation will be determined by the skill levels of 
the staff implementing the system. However as staff 
turnover rates are common in the IT industry it is 
worthwhile considering the level of support that is 
available from the vendor.  
i) Signature Updates 
Any signature based IDS is dependent upon it 
signatures to detect intrusions. The abilities of these 
systems to detect new, or even modified intrusions has 
been shown to be poor (Allen 2000). In order for these 
systems to be effective updated signatures must be 
available as new vulnerabilities and exploits are 
discovered. Many signature based systems now allow 
the operator to create their own signatures. This can 
allow the system to monitor for new alerts as they are 
discovered without relying on the vendor to supply 
updates. However monitoring vulnerabilities and writing 
signatures as they occur is a demanding task. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Selecting and implementing a NIDS is a 
challenging task. There are a number of factors to be 
considered, and these factors will change from situation 
to situation. In order to ensure a successful 
implementation an organization should determine its 
requirements and then locate a system that meets them. 
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